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I.

A

STATEMENT OF TI-[E CASE

NATURE 0F CASE:
This

is

an appeal from ajury verdict. Plaintiff Appellant, Donald Frizzell

(Frizzell),

was a

Beneﬁciary of a trust for which Defendant/Respondent, Edwin DeYoung (DeYoung), served as
Trustee. Defendant/Respondent, Darlene

Trust and

is

Edwin DeYoung. The

the wife of the Trustee,

and Dispute Resolution Agreement

Agreement sought

parties to this case entered into a Trust

(“TEDRA Agreement”)

to resolve then existing legal claims

Agreement modiﬁed portions of the
B.

DeYoung (DeYoung), was also a Beneﬁciary of the

in

October 2014. The

between the

parties.

The

TEDRA

TEDRA

original Trust. (R. 102, Jury Instruction l7)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
In

October 2016 Frizzell ﬁled

The

his duty to Beneﬁciary Frizzell.

based upon the language of the

suit in District

District Court,

Court erred

in

DeYoung breached

upon DeYoung’s Motion, dismissed the

suit

TEDRA Agreement. This Court reversed the Trial Court’s Order

of Dismissal and remanded the matter back to the
District

Court alleging Trustee

District Court. This

Court ruled that the

dismissing Frizzell’s Complaint because the parties were not able to waive

future claims for negligence or breach. (R. 11-20)

Frizzell

ﬁled an

Amended Complaint on May

Answer and Counterclaim on June

27,

Question #1: Did Edwin DeYoung
as Trustee? The Jury answered “No.”

informed of its

2018 (R. 22) The DeYoungs ﬁled an

2018 (R. 36) The case was

The Jury returned a verdict which contained

Question #2: Did Edwin

18,

DeYoung

tried to

a jury

in July

2019.

the following Special Interrogatories:

fail to act

as a prudent

man

in carrying out his duties

keep the Beneﬁciaries of the Trust reasonably
administration? The Jury answered “No.”
fail

to

Question #3: Did Edwin DeYoung, as Trustee of the Trust, breach the
Agreement? The Jury answered “No.”

TREDRA

Question #4: Did Edwin DeYoung, as Trustee, and/or Darlene
of possession of monies? The Jury answered “No.”

Question #5: What

is the total amount of damage sustained by
The Jury leﬁ this answer blank.

Trustee’s action?

Question #6: Did Donald Frizzell breach the

DeYoung deprive Plaintiﬁ‘

Plaintiff as a result

ofthe

TEDRA Agreement? The Jury

answered “Yes.”
Question #7: What

Donald

Frizzell’s actions?

the total

is

amount of damage sustained by Defendant as a result of

The Jury answered $70,000.00.

(R. 128- l 30)

The DeYoungs ﬁled a Motion

for an

Award ofAttomey’s Fees and Costs

pursuant to

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 on August 15, 2019. The Motion was supported by the

Aﬁidavit of DeYoungs’

DeYoungs’ Motion

The

District

counsel. (R. 131-] 81) Frizzell did not object or respond to the

trial

for Fees

and Costs.

Court entered Judgment

Judgment amount was

for the

sum of the

in favor the

Jury’s

II.
1.

Did the

+ $98,478.80 =

2019. The
costs

$168,478.80) (R. 182)

on October 4, 2019. (R. 185)

ISSUES PRESENTED

District

1,

damage verdict plus the amount of fees and

claimed by the DeYoungs in their Motion. ($70,000
Frizzell ﬁled the instant appeal

DeYoungs on October

ON APPEAL

Court commit a manifest abuse of discretion regarding

its

rulings on

the admission of evidence?
2.

Did

Frizzell

waive his right to contest the attomey’s fees and costs award entered by

the District Court?
3.

Are the DeYoungs

entitled to attomey’s fees

III.

and costs on appeal?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Unless justice requires otherwise, no error
other error by the court or a party,

is

in

admitting or excluding evidence, or any

grounds for granting a

new trial,

for setting aside a verdict,

or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order.

proceeding, the court must disregard

all

errors

At every stage of the

and defects that do not affect a party’s substantial
2

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 This court reviews errors

rights.

.

admission or exclusion

in the

of evidence under a standard of a manifest abuse of discretion and a showing
right

of a party

is

Van vs PortneufMed.

affected by the ruling.

330 P.3d 1054, 1059 (2014). The burden
discretion. Merrill vs Gibson,

is

156 Idaho 696, 701,

Ctr., Inc.,

on the party asserting error to show an abuse of

139 Idaho 840, 842, 87 P.3d 949, 952 (2004).

admission or the exclusion of evidence

is

that a substantial

grounds for granting a

new trial

No error in either the

or for setting aside a

verdict unless refusal to take such action appears to the court to be inconsistent with substantial
justice.

Burgess vs Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565, 903 P.2d 730 (1995). Error which

does not aﬂ‘ect the substantial right of a party

L&L Furniture Mart,

Inc. vs

Boise Water

is

considered harmless and

Com,

is

to

be disregarded.

120 Idaho 107, 813 P.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1991).

This court shall not consider issues that are raised for the ﬁrst time on appeal. Parsons vs Mutual

ofEnumclaw Insurance Company, 143 Idaho 743, 746, 152 P.3d 614,
Failure to timely object to a

Memorandum of Costs and

waiver of a right to contest the entitlement to the costs or

fees.

61 7 (2007).

Attorney’s Fees constitutes a

Lowery vs Board ofCounty

Commissioners, 115 Idaho 64, 764 P.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1998); Afﬁrmed 117 Idaho 1079, 793
P.2d 1251 (1990).

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW OF THE CASE.
This court’s decision

in Frizzell

I

was

straightforward and unambiguous. This court ruled,

as a matter of law, that future acts of negligence or breach cannot be contractually waived.
such, Frizzell maintained his ability to have his allegations heard by a trier of fact.

jury and had his day in court.

The jury

rejected his claims as a matter

of fact.

As

He chose

a

Frizzell

now alleges the District Court erred

Agreement resolved

all

future claims

opening brief p. 23) This allegation
In support

of his claim,

is

in admitting

evidence that the

and thus barred Frizzell’s current claims. (Appellant’s
not supported in the record.

Frizzell points this court to the District Court’s evidentiary

rulings at pages 321-322 ofthe trial transcript (direct examination
Frizzell’s counsel),

pages 790-791 of the

Embry by DeYoungs’
by

TEDRA

trial transcript (direct

of Edwin DeYoung by

examination of Attorney Greg

counsel) and pages 907-908 (cross examination of Attorney Greg

Frizzell’s counsel). Proper objections

were lodged regarding these areas of testimony.

Frizzell also assigns error to the District

which was given or produced without

Embry

Court regarding other testimony and/or argument

Frizzell lodging

an evidentiary objection. These claims

should not be considered by the court. Ballard vs Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 378 P.3d 464 (201 6).

The

District

Court correctly perceived the important delineation of pre

TEDRA and post

TEDRA facts. The court recognized that given the factual and procedural history of the Trust and
formation of the

TEDRA the jury would need to hear testimony of pre TEDRA activities for the

purpose of providing “context and continuity” within a complicated set of circumstance that
occurred over eight years. (Tr. Vol.

I,

p.

217, L. 4-8)

Steve Masterson was the ﬁrst witness called by Frizzell. Steve Masterson was the

DeYoungs’ Trust Advisor. The
containing pre

District Court, in ruling that a part

of his testimony, although

TEDRA material, was admissible for the purpose of providing context and

continuity to the jury’s understanding of the events, set the tone and the ground rules for the rest

ofthe

trial

regarding

TEDRA related testimony.

Further, the District Court established

Court, in ruling on the

DeYoungs’ Motion

its

keen grasp on the law of the case where the

for a Directed Verdict stated:

“The

have been in litigation, a couple different litigations, for many years,
with some breaks in between the two different litigations. And l recognize that the
ﬁrst litigation that ended with the TEDRA Agreement is not before the court,
parties

TEDRA, which is what this law suit is about,
by the TEDRA and conduct and rights and duties
that still could be governed by the Trust to the extent the TEDRA does not
supplant particular provisions of the Trust.”
except in so far as

and conduct that

Frizzell called

is

directed

you

(Tr. Vol.

II,

Under questioning, on

as a witness.

following question:

recall early

on

320, L. 23-25)

referred'to a ruling in the

2013

litigation

TEDRA. The question was objected to by DeYoungs’
upheld.

where the court ordered you,
from the Trust?”

in that litigation

to stop paying attomey’s fees

p.

direct examination,

TEDRA Trustee’s fees. As part of that colloquy Frizzell’s

DeYoung the

“And do you

The question

resulted in the

called for

Edwin DeYoung

counsel discussed the issue of pre

counsel asked Edwin

it

which led to the formation of the

counsel.

The

objection

was properly

A 2013 ruling, in a different law suit, by a different court, prior to the existence of the

TEDRA was not relevant to the instant determination of whether the TEDRA Agreement was
breached by either party.

The

TEDRA Agreement was introduced into the record via the ﬁrst witness Steve

Masterson. Attorney Greg

modiﬁed

parts

Embry draﬁed

rights

and

TEDRA Agreement. The TEDRA Agreement

of the Trust and as Judge Meyer stated

panics going forward from October
Trust and the

the

TEDRA. The jury

responsibilities

l,

2014. Greg

needed to hear

were created so as

the Beneﬁciaries as well as to

to

was necessary

deﬁned the

Embry

rights

and duties of the

testiﬁed as to the interplay between the

how the TEDRA modiﬁed the Trust and what
wind down and

why the TEDRA came

IV, p. 780-797) This testimony

it

fully distribute the Trust assets to

into existence in the ﬁrst place. (Tr. Vol.

for the jury to understand the conduct

which was

required by both parties and whether either party’s claims for breach were valid.

Greg Embry’s testimony. did he

On

cross examination

state the

by

TEDRA

Nowhere

in

barred Frizzell’s current claims.

Frizzell’s counsel,

Greg Embry was asked about the Supreme

Court’s unanimous decision giving Frizzell a favorable decision.

An

objection

was properly

sustained. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 907, L. 18-25, p. 908, L. 1-8) This Court’s ruling in Frizzell

Iwas not

relevant to the jury’s determination of whether a breach of duty had occurred since October

1,

2014. Further, the phrasing of the question, as well as the substance, was unduly prejudicial and

may

likely

The

have confused the jury;
District Court’s ruling

on evidentiary objections

acutely aware ofthe law of the case.

The Court’s

clearly indicate the court

was

evidentiary rulings were proper under the Idaho

Rules of Evidence and did not aﬂ‘ect the substantial rights of Frizzell nor where those rulings a
manifest abuse of discretion.

THE TESTIMONY OF STEVE MASTERSON, EDWIN DEYOUNG AND GREG
EMBRY CLEARLY ESTABLISH THE TRIAL WAS LIMITED TO POST TEDRA
BREACH CLAIMS.
B.

Steve Masterson was the DeYoungs’ Trust Advisor and Trust Expert. Masterson
called as Frizzell’s ﬁrst

trial

questioning regarding the

witness.

On

was

direct examination counsel for Frizzell, during

TEDRA Agreement, asked:

...”sometime

in 2014. So you know all those other claims that were brought by
on one side and the DeYoungs on the other side, those claims were
extinguished, they were gotten rid of”. ..

Mr.

Frizzell

Masterson answered, “That’s

my understating.”

Edwin DeYoung testiﬁed, on
Question:

And

(Tr. Vol.

direct examination

I,

by

p. 180, L. 3-8)

Frizzell’s counsel, as follows:

is it true that everything in the TEDRA Agreement, all your
any previous allegations about breaches by either you or Mr.
Frizzell were waived and released pre TEDRA? Correct.
-

-

Answer:

Yes.

Question:

And

is not about any allegations
of ﬁduciary breaches from the start of the Trust forward, just from
the date of the TEDRA forward; correct?

Answer:

Correct.

Question:

Answer:

so

is it

So Mr.

same law suit. Causes of action
might be the same, but would you agree this is not the same law
suit, it’s not about the same set of facts?
Yes,

Frizzell is not bringing the

it’s

(Tr. Vol.

Greg Embry testiﬁed on
Question:

Answer:

also true that this law suit

a different period of time.
II,

p. 509, L. 14-25, p. 510, L. 1-3)

direct examination as follows:

What

in section

6 of the

TEDRA addresses that allegation?

So paragraph 6 is pretty short. It’s just one sentence, and it says
Don, on behalf of himself and two of the other Beneﬁciaries,
who Don was a custodian of, on behalf of those two individuals,
Don agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold Ed harmless from and
that

against any claims, law suits, or other actions, including

and attomey’s fees advanced by
administration of the Trust.

So

to paraphrase that,

Ed
Ed

about, basically, his

it’s

— against Ed relating to

saying

if there are

work as a

Trustee,

claims

Don

all

costs

Ed’s

made

against

agrees to defend

against those claims, he agrees to waive those claims, release
them. In other words, he won’t pursue them. And if they’re made

by somebody

else,

Ed

will

jump

in

— sorry, Don will jump

in

and

defend that claim made against Ed. So that’s one section.
Question:

In all fairness, that provision applies retroactively to conduct prior
to the

Answer:

That
part

TEDRA Agreement;

is
is,

should

is

that correct?

correct. In essence it’s looking.

yes,

..

yes and no. So the yes

applies to claims that have already been made,

it

know what those

based on facts

are.

And also,

it

would apply

So a claim like that may not have been made
based on history. So its saying that things that
the past, we’re going to put that behind us, and Don
prior.

at this point, but it’s

were done
is

in

we

to claims

agreeing to that.

It’s all

put to bed with this agreement.

And even though a claim may not exist today,

if a claim aﬁer this
agreement pops up and it’s made based on past events or past facts
or something that existed as of the date ofthis October 2014

TEDRA,

that is

waived by Don as a claim against Ed.

(Tr. Vol. IV, p. 891, L. 3-25, p. 892, L. 1-13)

It is

noteworthy that Frizzell failed to properly address

examination of Greg Embry.

this issue during his cross

He had ample opportunity to address any

perceived conﬁJsion

regarding the time frame applicable to the instant claims. Frizzell had his opportunity to present
his claims to the jury.

How he chose to do so was within his own control. Nothing in this record

indicates the Distn'ct Court erred regarding the admission or exclusion

evidence the Court allowed testimony that the

C.

of evidence nor

is

there

TEDRA resolved all future claims.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS CURED ANY CLAIMED PREJUDICE.
Assuming arguendo

that

Greg Embry’s testimony regarding the

TEDRA was prejudicial

or confusing, the admission of that testimony did not affect Frizzell’s substantial rights because
the defect, if any,

was cured by

the jury instructions. Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC, vs

The Harford Fire Insurance Company, 153 Idaho 716, 291 P.3d 399 (Idaho 2012) Here, as

Lakeland True Value Hardware,

LLC vs

The Harford Fire Insurance Company, the jury

instructions, with their separate presentation

may have been

in

of their

distinct concepts cured

any prejudice

that

caused by the admission of improper testimony.

Jury Instruction #7 provides in part, “The parties entered into a Trust and Dispute

Resolution Agreement

(“TEDRA Agreement”)

contract between the parties that

Jury Instruction #8

is

October 2014. The

TEDRA Agreement is a

portions of the Trust.” (R. 102)

the legal standard for a breach of contract instruction. (R. 103) That

instruction clearly relates to post

at issue.

modiﬁed

in

TEDRA conduct as the TEDRA Agreement is the very contract

Jury Instructions #9 through #12 are
Jury Instruction #13

is

it is

contract related instructions. (R. 104-107)

the conversion instruction. (R. 108) There

alleging any conduct involving pre

cited jury instructions

all

TEDRA conversion. Read

clear the conversion cause

in context

was no testimony
with the previously

of action sounds during the post

TEDRA

period.

Jury Instructions #14 through #16 establish the rights and responsibilities of a Trustee.
(R. 109-1

1

l)

Again, these instructions read in context with the previous jury instructions

establish clearly that these jury instructions relate to post

Jury Instruction #20

is

the

TEDRA conduct.

DeYoungs’ elements of a contract

instruction. (R. 115)

Jury Instructions #23 and #24 are the damages instructions related to the breach of

ﬁduciary duty and breach of contract claims. (R. 118-120)

There

is

nothing

in theses jury instructions to

support the assertion by Frizzell that the

District Court’s rulings “leﬁ the jury with the impression that the

TEDRA

barred the current

claims.” Conversely, the jury instructions clearly tasked the jury with deciding the factual
question:

Did

either

Edwin DeYoung or Don

their respective duties to

each other?

It is

Frizzell breach the

TEDRA Agreement or violate

noteworthy that Frizzell did not seek to submit a

curative jury instruction regarding his claim of prejudice and/or confusion.
Finally, the jury verdict is right

Question #6:

Did Donald

Answer to Question

on

Frizzell

#6: Yes.

(emphasis added) (R. 128-130)

point:

breach the

TEDRA Agreement?

Donald

Frizzell

had every opportunity to

litigate his

claims before the

received his day in court. Thejury, however, determined Frizzell

trier

was unable to

of fact. He

establish a

meritorious claim.

D.

THE JURY’S VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
This court must afﬁrm the jury verdict

evidence. Lakeland True Value Hardware,

if

it is

LLC vs

supported by substantial and competent

The Harvard Fire Insurance Company, 153

Idaho 716, 291 P.3d 399 (Idaho 2012). The evidence presented
light

most favorable

to the party

who prevailed

at trial.

at trial will

be construed

in the

The court will not second guess the jury’s

determination as to the weight of evidence and issues of witness credibility. Van vs Portneuf

Medical Center,

Thejury
to prevail

on

Inc.,

156 Idaho 696, 701, 330 P.3d 1054, 1059 (2014).

instructions established Frizzell

his claims.

The evidentiary bar of “willful misconduct” and/or “gross negligence”

were important vestiges of the
Vol.

I,

p.

had the burden of proving a heightened standard

Frizzell

Family Trust.

(Tr.

Exh. Plaintiff’s 2) (R. 192-194) (Tr.

214, L. 1-16)

The DeYoungs’ witnesses included Steve Masterson, Trust Advisor and Trust Expert,
Attorney Greg Embry,

CPA Chris Harrison and Edwin and Darlene DeYoung. Donald Frizzell

was the only witness he offered on

his

own

behalf.

Steve Masterson testiﬁed on behalf of the DeYoungs. Counsel for Frizzell adduced his
experience, education and certiﬁcations. (Tr. Vol.
In short, Steve Masterson, has

almost 36 years.

He

is

the

I,

p.

been managing

owner of Trust

139-147)

trusts

and

settling estates professionally for

Solutions, Inc.

Steve Masterson testiﬁed that Edwin DeYoung, as Trustee, satisﬁed his duty to report

and inform the Beneﬁciaries of the Trust’s expenses and income.

10

(Tr. Vol.

I,

p. 222, L. 7-9).

The

Trust

was a complex

set

of circumstances. The Trust included properties

The Trust included income producing
maintenance. The Trust,

in general,

properties.

was

in three different states.

Some ofthe properties were

in

real estate rich but cash poor. (Tr. Vol.

Edwin DeYoung was responsive to Steve Masterson’s

was

I,

p.

reasonable. (Tr. Vol.

I,

p.

227, L. 1-6)

Edwin and Darlene DeYoung paid

for Trust expenses out

insufﬁcient cash to cover the expenses.
the Trust had insufﬁcient

The only

loaned

the Trust

I,

p.

229, L. 11-18) Edwin

money

Chris Harrison, the Trust

Trust expenses.

DeYoung

p. 232, L. 5-8)

own pocket when the

Trust had

to the Trust

Edwin and Darlene DeYoung

own pocket, some of which were never repaid. Edwin and

to the Trust,

criticism Steve Masterson

DeYoung allowed himselfto be

of their

I,

Edwin and Darlene DeYoung loaned money

ﬁmds to cover the

paid for Trust expenses from their

DeYoung

25)

Edwin DeYoung prepared a proper accounting

satisﬁed his legal requirements to the Beneﬁciaries of the Trust. (Tr. Vol.

Darlene

p. 22, L.

226, L. 1-6) Edwin DeYoung’s hourly rate for his services, as Trustee,

regarding the income and expenses of the Trust. (Tr. Vol.

when

I,

request for information and documents.

Edwin DeYoung followed through with communications between himself and
Consultant. (Tr. Vol.

need of

bullied

CPA,

some of which was never repaid.

had of Edwin DeYoung, as Trustee,

by Donald

Frizzell. (Tr. Vol.

testiﬁed Trustee

I,

p.

is

that

Edwin

232, L. 9-14)

Edwin DeYoung followed

his advice

acted prudently regarding decisions related to the Trust’s 2015 IRS tax return ﬁling. (Tr. Vol.
p.

272, L. 10-18)

The

Trust’s

Frizzell’s social security

2015 tax

number as

return

Frizzell

was never ﬁled because

was a Beneﬁciary

from the Trust for the tax year 201 5. Donald

the ﬁling required

to the Trust

Frizzell, against his

11

I,

Donald

and received income

attomey’s advice, reﬁlsed to

provide his social security number. The 2015 Trust tax return was never ﬁled. (Tr. Vol.
L. 21,p. 273, L. 13)

and

I,

p.

272,

Edwin DeYoung’s testimony
504.

It is

impossible to properly cite

stretches

all

from page 423 of the

trial

transcript through

page

of the relevant testimony and evidence which supported

the ﬁnding ofthe jury as those pages must be read in their totality to fully appreciate the
weight,
gravity and integrity

which

is

reﬂected in that testimony. However, there are a number of

answers towards the end of Edwin’s “cross examination” that go directly to the heart of the
jury’s decision.

Edwin

testiﬁed he did not breach his duties as Trustee.

throughout his time as Trustee.

Darlene

DeYoung

He did everything

equally regarding the

in his

He acted

power to

treat

with circumspection

both Donald Frizzell and

management of the Trust properties. He communicated

with both Beneﬁciaries regarding what he was doing on behalf of the Trust and

doing

it.

He

responded to requests for additional information as they were made.

legal counsel.

He relied on a Certiﬁed

Consultant. (Tr. Vol.

else,

II, p.

Darlene

Public Accountant.

503, L. 16, p. 504, L. IO)

he responded, “If I could have,

I

would have.”

He

relied

When asked
(Tr. Vol.

DeYoung testiﬁed that Edwin DeYoung,

II,

on

if he

spent working on behalf of the Beneﬁciaries. Darlene
personally expended the

sum of $75,848.03

in

could have done anything

p. 504, L. 11-12)

as Trustee, logged 531 total Trustee

DeYoung

Greg Embry’s testimony
page 777 ofthe
the

trial transcript

trial

is

extensive.

in

unreimbursed time

further testiﬁed the

attomey’s fees, property taxes

and miscellaneous loans to the Trust that remain unpaid.

The

He relied on

his expert Trust

hours that did not get reimbursed. This equates to approximately $42,000

DeYoung,

how he was

(Tr. Vol. III, p.

DeYoungs

owed by the Trust,

738 L.

l3, p. 739, L. 8)

relevant portion of his testimony begins at

and continues through page 895. As with the testimony of Edwin

transcript regarding

Greg Embry’s testimony needs

Again however, Greg Embry’s testimony can be summarized
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to

be read

in the

in its entirety.

following exchange:

“In that 20 plus years of experience as applied to this case did

Question:

Edwin DeYoung meet the
“I

Answer:

would say

yes, but

I

duties required

think a

of him by law?”

more complete answer, and it’s hard
The question of, you know, did Ed

to stop with yes, at least for me.

perform his minimal duties? Yes. Safe guard the assets? He did,
especially in the time frame from the TEDRA signing forward. He

was

basically to continue to

short period of time that

manage Trust

may

however a
He signed the deeds in front of

be.

assets for

him.”

“And

the reason

beyond

that.

He

think

I

it

is, Ed went
much more than that.

requires a fuller answer

did the minimal, but he did

When the Trust ran

out of money to pay Ed for what he was
supposed to be doing, Ed didn’t stop, he didn’t resign. Trustees can
resign. They can step down from that roll. And instead, Ed

continued to work without being paid. That’s not part of the
Trustee’s duties. That’s well beyond the Trustee’s duties.”

“So he incurred

time. That’s part

of his

life

trying to get this thing

ﬁnished, but not be paid for.”

“He also went and

spent not Trust money, but his money, and

signiﬁcant amounts of money, to try to get what was Don’s
responsibility under the TEDRA, and that was to provide the

of documents and take on responsibility for these assets
were being distributed to Don. Ed did that himself, with his

transfer
that

own money,
practice,

I

not Trust money. That really - - at least in my
haven’t seen that happen. lt is not contemplated as

anywhere within the
injecting their

was another person’s

By contrast, Donald
He chose

park of the Trustee’s duties, an individual

complete work
and that person was Don.”

in this case, to

responsibility

III,

p. 653, L. 13, p.

654, L. 8)

It is

more of the

not the Trustee’s fault that Donald

chose not to record deeds that had been signed by the Trustee. (Tr. Vol.

19, p. 656, L. 1-24, p. 657, L. 13-15)

as long as

it

took. (Tr. Vol.

his duties as Trustee

that

Frizzell testiﬁed as followed:

not to record deeds the Trustee had signed transferring one or

properties to him. (Tr. Vol.

Frizzell

ball

own time, money,

III,

It

III,

p.

654, L. 9-

wasn’t the Trustee’s fault that the Hegsstad Petition took

p. 654, L. 12-21) Frizzell believed that

by having the property manager

13

in

Arizona,

Edwin Deyoung breached

Nancy

Gintner, incur a

$10 a

month postage and money order

(Tr Vol.

fee.

Embry was making decisions based upon
behalf ofthe DeYoungs. (Tr. Vol.

was the

III,

p. 666, L. 5-16) Frizzell believed that

his incentive to continue to get paid for his

p. 671, L. 9, p. 672, L. 2)

III,

Donald

Attorney

work on

Frizzell believed that

it

Trustee’s obligation to provide notarizations on deeds that had been prepared
by

Frizzell’s legal counsel. (Tr. Vol.

683, L. 22, p. 685, L. l7)

p.

III,

The following answers given by Donald

Frizzell leﬁ

no doubt

in the jury’s

mind

that his claims

lacked merit:

Question:

“How,

in

your opinion, did Ed intentionally
Beneﬁciary to the Trust?”

interfere

with your

rights as a

Answer:

“I don’t

have an answer for you

(Tr. Vol.

Question:

Answer:

“What

III,

this

moment.”

p.685, L. 22, p. 686, L. l)

do you have to support your assertion
behave in a neutral, professional manner in regard
transferred to you?”
facts

“Well, partly I’m blanking

answer for you

“What

that

Ed

did not

to assets being

my response that I had I don’t have an

at this second.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 686, L. 2—8)

Question:

do you have to support your assertion that Ed failed to
account for assets, expenses and distributions of trust assets other
than a sole, incomplete, inaccurate, and self serving accounting?”

Answer:

“I don’t

facts

have an answer for you

at this

moment.”

(Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 686, L. 15-21)

“The language “a

Question:

sole, incomplete, inaccurate, and self serving
accounting” those were your words, were they not?”

Answer:

“In

my complaint,

(Tr. Vol.

Questions:

III,

I

believe.”

p. 686, L.

“What did he do

24-25, p. 687, L. 1-6)

to fail to inform

you

either directly or through his

agents?”

Answer:

“I don’t

have an answer for you

(Tr. Vol. III, p. 687, L. 10-13)
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at this

moment.”

“What duties as a Trustee

Qumtion:

did, in

your opinion, Ed

fail to

perform?”

Answer:

“Aﬁer the

Question:

“Uh-huh.”

Answer:

“Okay.

I

that’s all

The trial testimony

TEDRA Agreement?”

believe he failed to maintain the properties, but I guess
I have at the moment.” (Tr. Vol. Ill, p.
688, L. 8-14)

clearly established a plethora

of substantial and competent evidence

supportive of the jury’s verdict. That verdict should be honored
by this Court.

E. FRIZZELL WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CONTEST THE AWARD OF
ATTORNEY’S
FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.

The

court shall not consider issues that are raised the ﬁrst time

on appeal. Parsons vs

Mutual ofEnumclaw Insurance Company, 143 Idaho 743, 746, 152 P.3d 614, 617
(2007).
Failure to timely object to a

Memorandum of Costs and Attomey’s

right to contest the entitlement to the costs or fees.

115 Idaho 64, 764 P.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1998);

of a

Lowery vs Board ofCounty Commissioners,

Afﬁrmed 117 Idaho

Lack of timely objection precludes a party against

fees constitutes a waiver

whom

fees are

1079, 793 P.2d 1251 (1990).

awarded from challenging the

award on appeal. Long vs Hendricks 114 Idaho 157, 754, P.2d 1194

(Ct.

App. 1988); modiﬁed

on other grounds, Long vs Hendricks, 117 Idaho 105 l, 793 P.2d 1233 (1990). See also
Bagley vs
Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 241 P.3d 972 (2010).
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(7) provides in part:

Aﬁer a hearing on an

objection to Attomey’s fees, or aﬁer the time for ﬁling an
objection has pass, the Court must enter an order setting the dollar amount of
Attorney’s fees, if any, awarded to any party in the action. If there was a
timely
objection to the amount of Attomey’s fees, the court must include in the order
it’s

reasoning and the factors

it

relied

award. ..
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on

in

determining the amount of the

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 also provides express language that a failure
to timely
object to the fees and costs claims bars future objections to those claims.
Idaho Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(d) and 54(e)(6).

On

July 25th,

2019 the Jury returned a verdict

awarded the DeYoungs $70,000
their

Motion

for

in

in favor

damages. (R. 128).

of Defendants DeYoungs and

On August

15th,

2019 the DeYoungs ﬁled

Attomey’s Fees and Costs and the Afﬁdavit of Scot D. Nass

in support

of

Defendant’s Motion for Attomey’s Fees and Costs (R. 131, 133). The DeYoungs’
Motion was

brought based on the contractual language contained within the

TEDRA Agreement as well as

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (R. l3 1). The Motion claimed Attomey’s
Fees and Costs in the

amount of $98,478.80.

(R. 139)

DeYoungs’ Motion was

in strict

The Afﬁdavit and supporting documents

in support

ofthe

compliance with the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(d) and Rule 54(e)(3).
Frizzell offered no objection or response to the DeYoungs’ Motion
for an
Attorney’s Fees and Costs.

On
the

October

15‘,

2019 the

amount of $168,478.80.

District

(R. 182) This

amount of Fees and Costs claimed

+ $98,478.80 Attomey’s
Frizzell

procedurally,

fees

waived his

Court entered a Judgment

in the

amount

is

DeYoungs’

and costs claim equals

right to object to the Fees

when he chose

the exact

in favor

Award

of the DeYoungs

sum of the jury

of

in

verdict plus the

post-verdict motion. ($70,000 jury verdict
total

judgment $168,478.80. (R. 128, 182)

and Costs Award, both substantively and

not to ﬁle a timely objection to the DeYoungs’ Motion. The District

Court’s Judgment constitutes entry of an order per Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(e)(7). See
also

US Bank National Association vs Kuenzli,

134 Idaho 222, 999 P.2d 877 (2000), citing

Brinkman vs Aid Insurance Company, 115 Idaho 346, 350-351, 766 P.2d 1227, 123 1-32
(1988),
where the court ruled

that

even absent express written ﬁndings by the Trial Court, the “proﬁle of
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the record” provides sufﬁcient information to uphold the Trial Court’s determination
of the fees

and costs

issue.

It

should be noted,

in

both

US Bank National Association and Brinkman, timely

objections to the Motions for Fees and Costs were lodged. Albeit distinguishable to the
instant

case because here no objection

Was

ﬁled, the Court’s “proﬁle ofthe record” reasoning

is

appropriately applied to this matter. Should this Court decide to address the substantive issue

regarding fees and costs.

V.

ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL

The DeYoungs

request attomey’s fees on appeal pursuant to I.C.
§ 15-8-208, Idaho

Code §12-120(3), Idaho Appellant Rule 41 and pursuant

to the

TEDRA

Agreement

itself.

Court should also afﬁrm the District Court’s award of attorney fees to the DeYoungs.

This

I.C. § 15-

8-208 provides,

(1) Either the District Court or the Court
costs,

on appeal may, in its discretion, order
including reasonable attomey’s fees, to be awarded to any pauy:
(a)

From any

(b)

From

(c)

From any nonprobate

court

party to the proceedings;

the assets of the estate or trust involved in the proceedings; or
asset that

is

the subject of the proceedings.

The

may

order the costs to be paid in such amount and in such manner as
the court determines to be equitable.
(2) This section applies to all proceedings

not limited

proceedings involving

to,

governed by

trusts,

this chapter including, but

decedent’s estates and properties, and

guardianship matters.

Additionally, "[c]ontractual terms providing for recovery of attorney fees incurred in
actions to enforce the contract represent an election by the parties to place the risk of litigation
costs

on the one who

the courts."

Zenner

is

v.

ultimately unsuccessful.

Such provisions are ordinarily

to

be honored by

Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 210 P.3d 552, 560 (2009) (quoting Holmes
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v.

Holmes, 125 Idaho 784, 787, 874 P.2d 595, 598

(Ct.

App. 1994)). The

TEDRA Agreement itself

states,

If

any dispute between or among the Parties concerning

this

Agreement hereto

results in litigation, the prevailing Party shall

Party not prevailing for all

be reimbursed and indemniﬁed by the
costs and expenses reasonably incurred by the prevailing

Party in enforcing or establishing his or her rights hereunder, including without
limitation court costs and reasonable attorney fees. (Tr. Exh. l)

This proceeding obviously involved the
clearly provides the prevailing party shall be

TEDRA

statutes.

The

TEDRA Agreement itself

awarded reasonable attomey’s

fees.

As

such, this

Court should aﬂirm the District Court’s award of attomey’s fees to the DeYoungs, and should also

award attomey’s fees to the DeYoungs on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The

Trial Court’s evidentiary rulings did not constitute a manifest abuse

Error, if any,

was harmless

as

it

was cured by the Jury

Instructions

of discretion.

and the testimony of other

trial

witnesses. Frizzell has failed to establish a substantial right

this

Court uphold the jury verdict consistent with the substantial and competent evidence which

was

violated. Justice requires

formed the basis of the jury’s decision.
Frizzell

waived his

right to contest the Trial Court’s

failing to timely object to the

and costs on

award of attorney’s fees and costs by

same. The DeYoungs are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees

Frizzell’s appeal to this Court.

Respectfully submitted by the undersigned.
iL

DATED the M day of May, 2020.

SCOT D. NASS Attorney for Respondents
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